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Abstract
Ambient Calculi represent a class of process calculi used to describe and model mobile and distributed computations. This
paper examines the most relevant of these calculi and focuses on an important dimension: the access control problem. In the
security world, a system is considered trusted if it controls the access to its resources, i.e. every request for the access to a resource
is honored if and only if the subject requiring the resource is an authorized user of the system and the request agrees with a given
policy. So the security problem for ambient calculi is investigated considering the authentication mechanism and the possibility
to implement security policies. Two examples have been chosen to illustrate these topics: the firewall and the communication by
means of named channels.
c© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
A major concern of the security in mobile and distributed systems is access control, i.e. the ability to restrict who
is authorized to use which resources and under what conditions. Actually a trusted system needs to meet this basic
requirement: every request for the access to a resource is honored if and only if:
(1) the subject requiring the resource exhibits suitable credentials;
(2) the request agrees with a given policy.
In every trusted system there is a nucleus of hardware and software tools (system calls, capabilities, firewalls,
antivirus, . . . ), the Trusted Computing Base (TCB), responsible for the access control. At the heart of the TCB lies the
Reference Monitor, a system module that accepts all requests involving security and halts the processes that violate
the chosen security policy. Obviously the Reference Monitor needs the definition and the realization of:
(1) authentication/authorization mechanisms
(2) security policies
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A well-known mechanism of representing security policies is the Access Control Matrix [17]. In this model, a system
is seen as a collection of objects, each with its own set of operations, and a set of domains. A domain is a set of
pairs 〈object, rights〉 that specify which operations (rights) can be performed on the object. The subjects of the system
(processes, users, . . . ) at every instant of time are in a domain, but they can switch from domain to domain during their
lifetime in the system. Conceptually this view of the system security is given by a bidimensional matrixM, whose
rows denote the domains and the columns the objects.M[d, o] = {op1, op2, . . . , opn} states that the subjects in the
domain d can perform the operations op1, op2, . . . , opn on the object o. The switching from domain to domain can
be seen as a right that the leaving domain can exercise on the entering one, so every domain can itself be an object. If
it is the system that imposes the security policy described by the Access Control Matrix, the access control is said to
be a mandatory access control, if it is the user that determines its rights on the objects, the access control is said to be
a discretionary access control.
The Access Control Matrix describes a security policy in the sense that it determines what a user in a domain can
do, but it is often necessary to define a management policy determining what a user in that domain is authorized to do.
For this purpose, many systems use security models that help the management of the chosen policy; for example the
multilevel security model [1] is based on a lattice of security levels, and every object and every domain are assigned
to one of these levels. A security policy can now be defined by means of the order relation on these levels, in the
sense that an operation on an object of level σ is allowed to a domain of level τ only if the pair 〈σ, τ 〉 belongs to
the order relation. This model is used for the write/read operations on documents; the most widely used policies are
the confidentiality policy (or military policy): no write down, no read up, that allows to control the confidentiality of
documents [1], the integrity policy (or BIBA policy) [2]: no read down, no write up, designed to guarantee the data
integrity, and the commercial policy or secret society policy: no read up, no write up, that hides the higher levels in
the hierarchy.
Traditional Reference Monitors are realized by means of hardware and software mechanisms, but in recent years,
techniques from programming languages such as program analysis, type checking, program rewriting have been
proposed for their implementation. [26] gives a survey of the results and the prospects for this language-based security
approach; it distinguishes two main schools: the techniques based on program rewriting leading to in-lined reference
monitors (IRM) and the techniques based on program analysis and type systems leading to type-safe programming
languages. In the first case, a trusted IRM rewriter, at load time, merges checking-code into the application. In the
second case a type system able to enforce a given security policy is associated with the application language and the
responsibility for producing applications that agree with the given policy is left to the programmer; the end user needs
only type check the code. It is obvious that in this case the security policies must be negotiated in advance. Besides
these two techniques the certifying compilation approach has been proposed; the idea is the introduction of a compiler
that, when the source code satisfies a given security policy, produces not only the object code but also a certificate
assuring that the object code respects the policy [22].
The main benefits of the language-based techniques and in particular of security type systems are flexibility and
compositionality. In fact these techniques, being based on software tools, do not depend on hardware and well tolerate
extensions and modifications of the system; moreover compositional type systems ensure that the insertion of secure
code into a security preserving context, gives a secure program. Finally these techniques allow the formulation of
fine-grained security policies.
The weakness of this approach is mostly a question of performance and of dynamic policies. As regards
performance the main limitation is the time required to prove type correctness; in practice a type system can be
used if the type checking for it is computable with a reasonable complexity bound. Moreover static type systems
cannot enforce security policies that change dynamically or that depend on conditions that run-time must be detected;
consequently it is necessary to enlarge the type system to take into account the information that is supplied at
run-time.
Almost all the calculi proposed for mobile and distributed systems take into account the security problem, so they
present mechanisms for access control, from the simple ones to the more refined ones. In this paper we consider the
Mobile Ambient Calculus defined by Cardelli and Gordon and some of its dialects. The main goal of the Mobile
Ambient Calculus is to provide a unifying set of programming constructs well-suited for wide area computation,
including primitives for mobility, communication, security and dynamic connectivity. Moreover in this calculus the
notion of administrative domains (or ambients) organized in a dynamic hierarchical structure is formalized. In this
context it is quite natural that many efforts have been devoted to study the access control problem. As the main
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Fig. 1. Syntax ofMA.
interest in Ambient Calculus is about movement and communication operations, the objects considered in security
settings are usually restricted to ambients (related to movement and opening operations) and messages (related to
write and read operations), whereas the domains are usually ambients and processes. The access control topic has
been approached either by showing how security tools can be realized using the primitives of the calculus, either by
providing programming constructs that can be mechanically analyzed via type systems.
In this paper we consider only access control policies that can be enforced by Reference Monitors in the sense of
[26], i.e. “policies that can be defined using criteria that individual executions must each satisfy in isolation”. So we
do not consider neither the information-flow ([24,29]) nor the availability policies [27]. The access control problem
for ambient calculi is investigated considering the authentication mechanism and the possibility to implement security
policies. Two examples have been chosen to illustrate these topics: the firewall and the communication by means of
named channels.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the authentication mechanisms and the
enforcement of security policies for the Mobile Ambient Calculus, introduced by Cardelli and Gordon in [9]. The
presence of objective moves and the creation of groups, introduced for this calculus, are also basic characteristics of
the M3 calculus considered in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the study of the access control in two other
important dialects of Mobile Ambient Calculus: the Safe Ambient Calculus and the Boxed Ambient Calculus. Finally
Section 6 identifies important challenges for future work.
2. The mobile ambient calculus
The calculus of Mobile Ambients (MA) has been introduced by Cardelli and Gordon [9], as a process calculus
for describing mobile computations. In MA the unit of calculus is the ambient n[P] that represents a bounded
space named n enclosing a multi-threaded process P . Process P can contain other ambients, may perform local
communications and may exercise movement capabilities: in m, out m to enter or exit other named ambients or
open m to dissolve ambient boundaries. The operator of restriction (ν n)P allows to hide a name outside P . The
communication is anonymous and local. Inside an ambient the parallel composition (x).P | 〈M〉 allows the process
(x).P to read the message M and continue as P{M/x}. On the set of mobile processes a contextual equivalence
relation ' is defined, assuring that equivalent processes in any context have the same behavior.
The syntax of MA calculus is given in Fig. 1 and the structural congruence in Fig. 2. As usual we omit trailing
dead processes, writing M for M.0, and we write (ν n,m)P for (ν n)(νm)P .
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Fig. 2. Structural congruence.
2.1. Authentication
The model of authentication of MA is very simple: the credentials required from a process in order to execute a
movement operation are the knowledge of the ambient name. So the names can be seen as passwords that inserted in
suitable capabilities give the ability to access to (or to disclose the contents of) an ambient. Moreover the restriction
operator (ν n) allows a process n[P] to exclude undesired clients. So the ambient n[P] is authorized to every external
process knowing the name n, whereas the process (ν n)n[P] does not allow any operation from any external process.
However if one wishes a more flexible mechanism to filter the processes entering into an ambient, one must impose
a suitable protocol. A classic example is that of firewall. In this case an ambient f [P] (the firewall) wants to give the
access authorization only to trusted processes. The firewall protocol requires that a trusted process Q: (a) knows three
ambient names: a, k, k′ (that act as credentials) and (b) embeds itself in the role of “agent” following this protocol:
AG = a[open k.k′[Q]].
Also the firewall f [P] must obey a suitable protocol:
FW = (ν f )( f [open a.open k′.P | k[out f.in a.in f ]]).
In [10] is proved that:
(ν a, k, k′)(FW | AG) ' (ν f )( f [Q | P])
provided that the conditions f /∈ f n(Q) and ( f n(Q) ∪ f n(P)) ∩ {a, k, k′} = ∅ are satisfied.
The contextual equivalence guarantees that the firewall protocol in any context cannot be damaged because of the
activities of external processes, that could engage some interactions with the process AG. Actually this is the reason
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for the presence of the ambient k′; in fact if the process Q were not embedded in the ambient k′, one could have, for
a process Q = in n.Q′, at a stage of the reduction, this state:
(ν a, f )( f [open a.P] | a[in f | in n.Q′])
and the ambient a could jump into an ambient n different from the firewall.
The task of a firewall is that of protecting an ambient, that is of preventing processes not knowing the right
passwords from entering. In [23] the possibility for a firewall to contain a “trapdoor” through which processes might
be able to enter is considered. For example if a firewall contains an ambient like t :
FW = (ν f )( f [open a.open k′.P | k[out f.in a.in f ] | t[out f.in f ] | open t])
a process can enter t and, by means of t , enter the firewall even if it does not know the right passwords. The control
flow analysis is used in [23] to devise a test for whether or not a firewall is protective, i.e. it cannot be entered by a
process ignoring the right passwords. In the following we ignore this aspect of the security problem in the sense that
we require the firewalls have no security hole caused by an insider.
2.2. Security policies
With regard to security properties, the Ambient Calculus can be studied from different points of view. One could
be interested in the control of the type of the exchanged values, or of the movements of processes or of the opening of
the ambients or of the read/write operations. With respect to the enforcing security policies, theMA does not provide
facilities, but type systems are a good technique to impose security constraints, in the sense that they assure that an
operation occurs only if it fits with a given policy.
The simpler example is when the security goal is to avoid exchanges of values of the wrong kind in the basic
communications. Recall that the basic MA communication is local to ambients and anonymous; a message M is
“dropped into the ether” of the ambient from an output process 〈M〉 and any input process (x).Q can receive it:
〈M〉 | (x).Q → Q{M/x}.
The type system presented in [10] has been designed exactly to control the topic of conversation into a given
ambient, in the hypothesis that the values exchanged be both ambient names or capabilities (however this system can
be easily extended to other kinds of expressions).
The basic type constructors are the ambient type Amb[T ] that describes the names of the ambients realizing
exchanges of type T , and the capability type Cap[T ] that describes the capabilities that may unleash exchanges
of type T . The exchange types can be either “shh” (no exchange) or a type describing a name or a capability. Typing
rules allow to deduce types for processes and ambients. A subject reduction theorem guarantees that the type system
works correctly.
By way of example let us consider the process:
R = m[in n.〈M〉] | n[open m.(x : W ).Q].
Under the hypothesis that the message M has type W , m and n are two ambients of type Amb[W ], the typing rules
assure that the process R is a well-typed process, whereas if M has type W1 6= W , R cannot be typed.
If besides the topic of conversation, the security goals concern also the mobility behavior of processes migrating
over networks, it is possible to use an extension of this type system [7]. In the new type system the basic types
have been enriched by a locking attribute, that says if an ambient can be opened by the suitable capability (unlocked
ambient) or it can never be opened (locked ambient), and by a mobility attribute, saying if a process must be considered
immobile or mobile. The syntax of these types and of the related typing rules are shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4.
As usual a subject reduction theorem proves the soundness of these typing rules, assuring that for typed processes, no
locked ambient will ever be opened, no immobile ambient will ever move, and every I/O exchange will always match
the topic of conversation. For the above example, if besides the previous hypothesis, one supposes that the ambient m
is an unlocked, mobile ambient and that the ambient n is a locked, mobile ambient, it is possible to prove that R is a
well-typed process, but if m is an immobile ambient, R cannot be typed.
The system security imposed by this type system can be visualized by an Access Control Matrix M, in which
the domains and the objects are ambients and the set R of rights contains the mobility right (enter), the opening
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Fig. 3. A type system forMA.
right (open) and the topic of exchanges.M[n,m] ⊆ R represents the rights that the processes inside ambient n can
exercise on the ambient m. It is straightforward that the security policies that this type system can enforce are rather
monolithic, because the rightsM[n,m] that a process P inside the ambient n can exercise on the ambient m depend
exclusively on the binary mobility attribute of the ambient n and by the binary locking attribute of the ambient m. It
is not possible, for example, to impose a policy that permits the opening of the ambient n only to a proper subset of
domains. Actually the set of all objects is partitioned into two groups: the Locked and the Unlocked ambients, and the
set of all the domains is partitioned in the group of Immobile and in the group of Mobile ambients. One can note that
the type of an ambient can be seen as the fusion between a short form of access list, saying for any object the opening
right and a short form of capability list that stores the mobility capability for any domain.
If one would impose a multilevel security policy for the I/O primitives, one could define a lattice of security levels
and devise a type system that associates with every process one of these security levels. The typing rules could impose
that every communication between processes occurs only if the respective security levels match the given security
policy.
In the previous example we could have ‘write right’ wσ for the process m[in n.〈M〉] running at level σ , and ‘read
right’ rρ for the process n[open m.(x : W ).Q] running at level ρ; so we can realize a confidentiality policy (imposing
that the I/O operation is admissible only if σ ≤ ρ) or an integrity policy (imposing that the I/O operation is admissible
only if ρ ≤ σ), but there is no way to realize a secret society policy.
A natural question is how to specify the security constraints if a model of communication different from the one
directly given by the I/O primitives is needed, that is if one represents the communication mechanism by means of
a suitable protocol, constructed on the MA primitives. One of the most studied models is the one of named com-
munication channels; the encoding proposed by [10] is as follows. A channel named c is represented by an ambi-
ent name cb (channel buffer); any output directed to the channel c is represented by an ambient named cp(channel
packet) that enters cb, deposits the message and exits; analogously an input from the channel c is represented by
an ambient cp that enters cb, executes the input operation and after input completion exits from the ambient cb.
a channel: ch c | P = (ν cb, cp)(cb[!open cp] | P)
asynchronous channel output: c〈M〉 = cp[in cb.〈M〉]
channel input: c(x).Q = (ν p)(cp[in cb.(x).p[out cb.Q]] | open p) with cb and cp fresh for Q
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Fig. 4. Typing rules forMA.
It is easy to see that these definitions work well, in the sense that:
c(x).Q | c〈M〉 | ch c →∗ Q{M/x} | ch c.
Using the type system of [10], it is possible to obtain a typed version of the channel that handles only packets of a
given type W .
a channel of type W : (ch c : Ch[W ]) | P = (ν cb, cp : Amb[W ])(cb[!open cp] | P)
asynchronous channel output: c〈M〉 = cp[in cb.〈M〉]
channel input: c(x : W ).Q = (ν p : Amb[shh])(cp[in cb.(x : W ).p[out cb.Q]] | open p)
If one imposes the constraint that the communication occurs only in the channels, the typing rules state that any
process different from a channel has type shh, whereas each channel buffer has the same type of the packets, owing
to the open capability. In the case that mobility and opening rights are considered, the type system of Fig. 3 and
Fig. 4 allows to type the communication channels only if the ambients involved in their definition are mobile and
unlocked, but it does not work if the communication buffers are considered immobile and locked. On the other hand
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the assumption that channels are immobile and locked is essential for security goal (because it guarantees protection
from malicious attacks). So different ways to encode channels have been proposed. To this aim, in [7] a new primitive,
the objectivemove “go”, has been added to the set of capabilities. If N is a path, go N .m[P]moves the ambient m[P]
as specified by the path N and has as continuation m[P]. Using the new set of capabilities it is possible to obtain a
new encoding of the channels without requiring the mobility of the ambient cb that opens the packets.
The objective move go is considered also in [8], where the security problem is approached by using name groups
and group creation to statically prevent certain communications and to block the accidental or malicious escape of
capabilities. The type system introduced in [8] allows to form various clusters of group names, according to the
security policy of the system. LetG,G′,H be finite sets of group names, the type of a process P is a triple: ∩G,◦H, T
storing the set of groups that P can cross (G), the set of groups that P can open (H) and the type T of the messages
that P can exchange. An ambient type has now the form: g∩G′[∩G,◦H, T ] and asserts that the ambient belongs to
the group g, may send continuations to ambients in the groups G′ by objective moves, may cross the ambients in
groups G by subjective moves, may open ambients in groups H and may contain exchanges of type T . It is clear that
the security policies that can be stated are more flexible with respect to the original of [7], because here it is possible
to declare and impose security properties such as: “this ambient belongs to the group packets and can enter only the
channel ambients”, “this ambient is a channel of type T , it cannot move or be opened”. In this case the domains of the
Access Control MatrixM can be the ambients, equipped with the name of the group which they belong to, and the
objects can be the groups.M[n, g] ⊆ {send, cross, open, T } represents the rights that the processes inside ambient
n can exercise on the ambients of the group g. For example, let us suppose that there are two ambient groups: pk
and ch (Packets and Channels), and that the ambients m and n belong to the ch group whereas p belongs to pk. The
Access Control MatrixM:
domain Group ch Group pk
m : ch {shh} {shh}
n : ch {W} {open, W}
p : pk {send , W} {open, W}
can be expressed by the following types:
m : ch∩{} [∩{},◦{}, shh]
n : ch∩{} [∩{},◦{pk},W ]
p : pk∩{ch} [∩{},◦{pk},W ]
that impose that the ambient m is an immobile, unlocked ambient in which there is no exchange, the ambient n is
an immobile ambient that can open only the ambients of pk group and contains exchanges of type W ; and p is an
ambient that can send only its continuations into the ch ambients, can open only the ambients of pk group and contains
exchanges of type W . One can note that the type of an ambient can be seen as a short form of capability list, storing,
for every ambient, the objects on which it has some rights.
3. The M3 calculus
The control of mobility based on ambient groups is used also in [15], where a different model (M3) is introduced.
In the modelM3 the local character of communication is maintained while the output is considered synchronous; the
open capability is dropped and a to capability allows a sequential process, that is a thread, to move directly from
an ambient to another, without its enclosing ambient. A process that executes the to action migrates into a sibling
ambient according to the reduction rule:
n[to m.P | Q] | m[R] → n[Q] | m[P | R].
Structural congruence is enriched by the rule:
(ν n : g)n[0] ≡ 0
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Fig. 5. A subset of typing rules forM3.
to get a form of garbage collection in absence of the open primitive and by the following two rules to handle name
restriction and simultaneous group restriction:
P ≡ Q ⇒ (ν n : Amb(g))P ≡ (ν n : Amb(g))Q
P ≡ Q ⇒ (ν{g1 : G1, . . . , gk : Gk})P ≡ (ν{g1 : G1, . . . , gk : Gk})Q.
Mobility and access control is done by means of types; in particular an ambient type or a process type is a group
name whose type describes the properties of all the ambients and processes of that group. The idea is that groups
and group types work as indirections between types and values, so as to avoid that types directly depend on values.
Obviously, a process of type Proc(g) can run safely only within ambients of type Amb(g). Group types for a group g
specify three movement privileges: the set of ambient groups where the ambients of group g (g-ambients) can stay (S),
the set of those that g-ambients can cross (C), the set of ambient groups where g-ambients can send their sequential
processes (E), and the type of communications within ambients of the same group (T ).
The consumption of a capability “to m” brings a process from its ambient to the ambient m, so if the “to m” is
performed by a process of group g1, its continuation is in another group g2, that of the ambient m. The form of the
capability reflects this fact, so it is of the shape Proc(g1) → Proc(g2), or, for simplicity, g1 → g2, because the
distinction between Amb(g) and Proc(g) is always clear from the context. Capabilities “in m” and “out m” do not
change the group since they do not change the enclosing ambient, but in case of a “out m” the ambient exiting must
have permission to stay where m is, in case of a “in m” the ambient entering m must have the permission to stay inside
m. These conditions are assured by containing relations on group types in the corresponding rules in Fig. 5.
The proof of the subject reduction for M3 assures that the evolution of a g-process cannot result in a process of a
different type. A bottom-up type inference algorithm that allows to perform a type analysis even when only incomplete
type assumptions about a process are available, is presented in [15].
3.1. Authentication
The M3 calculus is essentially a typed calculus; so the authentication is performed by types. The credentials that
a process P must exhibit to enter an ambient m are again the knowledge of the ambient name, but the type system
requires also that the group type g of P allows the crossing into the ambient group of m, in the sense that the ambient
group of m must occur in the set of the ambient groups that g-ambients can cross.
To illustrate the authentication problem, one can consider again the firewall protocol. It can be simplified in the
following way [13]:
AG = a[(x : g f → ga).x .Q]
FW = (ν f : g f ). f [to a.〈to f 〉 | P].
The process (ν a : ga)(AG | FW ) can be typed with the group g0 by assuming the groups ga and g f typed as follows:
ga : gr({g0},∅, {g f }, g f → ga)
g f : gr ({g0},∅, {ga}, shh).
The agent has only to embed itself in the role of “agent”, and the firewall simply sends the path to enter.
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3.2. Security policies
The type system ofM3 permits to express fine discrimination about the access to ambients. In this case the domains
and the objects of the Access Control MatrixM can be the group names and the set R of rights contains the rights
to stay, to cross, to send sequential processes and the topic of exchanges. By way of example, let us suppose a system
formed by the parallel composition of three users U1,U2,U3 with a file server FS containing three directories D1,
D2 and D3. Let each user Ui be realized by a process running in the ambient ui , the file server by an ambient f s
containing as immediate subambients the ambients d1, d2 and d3. The security policy enforced on the users by the
following fragment of access control matrixM:
f s d1 d2 d3
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
u1 {stay, cross, T } {stay, cross, T} {stay, cross, T} {stay, cross, T}
u2 {stay, cross, T} - {stay, cross, T} -
u3 {stay, cross, T} - - {stay, cross, T}
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
can be realized by the following group types (in the hypothesis that an ambient m belongs to the group gm , and that
g0 represents the group of the top level term):
gu1 : gr({g0, g f s, gd1 , gd2 , gd3}, {g f s, gd1 , gd2 , gd3},∅, T )
gu2 : gr({g0, g f s, gd2}, {g f s, gd2},∅, T )
gu3 : gr({g0, g f s, gd3}, {g f s, gd3},∅, T )
Also in this case the type of a domain can be seen as a short form of capability list, storing for every group name
the objects on which it has some rights.
M3 calculus can well express the more common protocols; the encoding of communication on named channels via
local anonymous communication within ambients is easily obtained:
a channel of type W : (ch c : Ch[W ]) | P = (νc : W )(c[out p] | P)
synchronous channel output: c〈M〉.Q = to c.〈M〉.to p.Q with c fresh for Q
channel input: c(x : W ).Q = to c.(x : W ).to p.Q with c fresh for Q
A channel created by an ambient p is represented as an ambient process c, exiting p. Processes that exhibit as first
action a read or a write operation on a channel c first move into the ambient c[ ], where communication takes place,
and then go back to where they belong.
(ν c) (p[c[out p] | to c.(x : W ).to p.P | to c.〈M〉.to p.Q]) →? (ν c) (p[P{M/x} | Q] | c[ ]).
By returning to the problem of implementing a multilevel resource access policy, it seems difficult to use this
encoding of channels to realize a communication between ambients at different levels of security. The pattern
“to c.read/wri te.to p”, that forces to give the permission to the channel to send threads to a process and to the
process to send threads to the channel, makes it quite hard to filter in different ways read and write access rights and
to allow the sending of threads between ambients at different security levels.
4. The safe ambient calculus
One of the more common phenomena in concurrency is the interference, that occurs when the activity of a process
interferes with the activity of other processes. An interference can occur because an ambient or process has to “choose”
between two reduction possibilities. A particularly dangerous form of interference, the grave interference [18] is
present when the choice of the partner in a reduction destroys or corrupts the possibility of exercising a capability
by a third process. The Safe Ambient Calculus (SA) [18] is introduced with the main aim of controlling both grave
interferences and ambient mobility (or dissolution) from the ambient object of the movement (or of dissolution). SA
is obtained from MA by adding to the three mobility actions three corresponding co-actions. So ambient behavior
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results from a subjective control exercised by the migrating process and an agreement given by the ambient where
command is consumed. The basic movement rules are:
n[in m.P1 | P2] | m[in m.Q1 | Q2] → m[n[P1 | P2] | Q1 | Q2]
m[n[out m.P1 | P2] | out m.Q1 | Q2] → n[P1 | P2] | m[Q1 | Q2]
open n.P | n[open n.Q1 | Q2] → P | Q1 | Q2
The removal of grave interferences is obtained by means of a type system which gives a type only to single-
threaded ambients. On the set of processes a behavioral equality ' is defined, that is a bisimulation-based relation.
Also in this calculus the equivalence between two processes means that the two processes are indistinguishable by
closing contexts.
4.1. Authentication
SA makes the protection mechanism of the MA calculus stronger: the knowledge of the ambient name is now a
necessary condition (but not sufficient condition) to execute movement (or dissolution) operations; in SA permission
(given by a co-capability) is also necessary from the ambient object of the operation. The occurrence of a co-capability
in the code of an ambient process, states when another process can exercise the corresponding capability providing
a useful tool for synchronization between the two processes; however it does not give any kind of control about who
(between the processes wishing exercise the capability) can actually perform the operation. Anyway, although the SA
primitives allow a finer control with respect to those ofMA, also in this calculus, special filter mechanisms need to be
realized by means of appropriate protocols. For example the firewall can now be realized as follows:
AG = a[in a.open k.(x).x .open a.Q]
FW = (ν f )( f [out f.in f.open a.P | k[out f.in a.open k.〈in f 〉]]).
In [18] it is shown that if f /∈ f n(Q) and a /∈ f n(P) then:
(ν a)(FW | AG) ' (ν a, f )( f [Q | P]).
Note that now the credentials for a trusted agent consist of the knowledge of only the two names a and k because
the process Q, blocked by the co-action open a, cannot move the ambient a anywhere, so the ambient k′ is no longer
necessary. Moreover, unlike the MA firewall, no restriction on the ambient k is needed as the co-actions (open and
in) control the opening and entering k.
The authentication schema of SA is improved in one of its variant: the Safe Calculus with Password (SAP) [20]
that introduces the notion of password in the syntax of capabilities. The password may be used by the ambient object
of the movement (or opening) operation, to select the ambients that can exercise the corresponding capability: only
the ambients that exhibit the same password can actually realize the movement (or the opening). Moreover, unlike
SA, the co-out capability out m is exercised by the target ambient rather then the ambient m; in fact it is the ambient
going to receive a process that runs the risk to be entered by a dangerous code, so it appears reasonable that it is up to
this ambient to give the emigrating permission.
m[n[out〈m, h〉.P | Q] | R] | out 〈m, h〉.S → n[P | Q] | m[R] | S
In SAP it is possible to generate new passwords and distribute them, hence an ambient process can control not
only when a movement (or an opening) can occur, but also who (by means of the password) can move into or open
its computation space. Also in this setting, the primitives of the calculus can be used to introduce particular protocols.
The firewall protocol, where the keys are explicitly specified only when necessary, becomes:
AG = a[in 〈a, ha〉.open 〈k〉.(x).x .open 〈a〉.Q]
FW = (ν h f )( f [in 〈 f, h f 〉.open a.P | k[out 〈 f, h f 〉.in 〈a, ha〉.open 〈k〉.〈in 〈 f, h f 〉〉]]) | out 〈 f, h f 〉)
In [20] it is shown that if ha /∈ f n(P) and h f /∈ f n(Q) then:
(ν ha)(FW | AG) ' (ν ha, h f )( f [Q | P])
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In this protocol the credentials to enter the firewall are no longer represented by the knowledge of the ambient names
a and k (that can be considered as public keys), but by the knowledge of the passwords ha and h f (private keys).
Another development of SA calculus towards more robustness is the calculus of Controlled Ambients (CA) [27].
In CA an ambient movement requires three actions: the capability (in n or out n) expressed by the ambient m that
wishes to move, the permission given by the ambient going to receivem (expressed by the co-capability in↓ m, in↑ m)
and the permission exercised by the ambient which m is leaving (expressed by the co-capability out↓ m, out↑ m). The
opening of an ambient requires the synchronization between the ambient m that opens (by means of the capability
open n) and the ambient n being opened (by means of the co-capability open {n,m}).)
n[in m.P1 | P2] | m[in↓ n.Q1 | Q2] | out↓ n.R → m[n[P1 | P2] | Q1 | Q2] | R
m[n[out m.P1 | P2] | out↑ n.Q1 | Q2] | in↑ m.R → n[P1 | P2] | m[Q1 | Q2] | R
m[open n.P1 | P2 | n[open {n,m}.Q1 | Q2]] → m[P1 | P2 | Q1 | Q2]
The above firewall protocol can be now described as:
AG = a[in↓ k.open k.(x).x .open {a, k}.Q]
FW = (ν f )( f [out↑ k.in↓ a.open a.P | k[out f.in a.open {k, a}.〈in f 〉]]) | in↑ k.out↓ k.out↓ a)
Also in CA the security of the firewall relies on the secrecy of two keys: k and the name of the agent a.
4.2. Security policies
LikeMA, SA does not provide any primitive to enforce security policies, but one can use a suitable type system to
enforce them. The SA type system, inspired by [7], controls both topics of communication and mobility operations.
To control movement there are three different types for ambients (processes): basic, immobile and single-threaded.
Basic ambients can only open (and be opened by) other basic ambients; immobile ambients can never be opened and
cannot jump into or out of other ambients; finally single-threaded ambients can exercise, at any moment, at most one
capability. In this system, the SA version of the aboveMA process R:
S = m[in n.open m.〈M〉]] | n[in n | open m.(x : W ).Q]
can be well typed under the assumptions that the message M has type W , n is an immobile ambient, and m is a
single-threaded ambient.
A significant improvement of the access control for SA is given in [16] by means of a type discipline that takes into
account a hierarchical structure of the mobility and opening rights. In this type system, every ambient name is associ-
ated with a security level σ ; on the set of security levels two partial orders are defined:≤∩ (for mobility rights) and≤◦
(for opening rights). The type system assures that an ambient with security level σ can be traversed (or opened) only by
ambients with a security level ρ, such that σ ≤∩ ρ (σ ≤◦ ρ). Formally an ambient type has the shape σ YV [T ZU ] where:
- σ is the security level of the ambient;
- T is the type of the exchange;
- Y represents the binary lock/unlock attribute;
- V represents the binary opening attribute;
- Z says if the ambient can move;
- U says if the ambient can or cannot be traversed.
The soundness result of the type system assures that if a process is typed, then no locked ambient will ever be
opened and no immobile ambient will ever move; moreover an unlocked ambient will be opened only by an ambient
with a security level greater or equal in the order ≤◦ and an unlocked ambient will be opened only by an ambient with
a security level greater or equal in the order ≤∩. By way of example, in this type system the above process S will be
typed only if:
- m is a mobile, unlocked ambient of level α, exchanging messages of type W;
- n is an ambient of level β, that can be traversed and that allows exchanges of type W;
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- the following order relations are satisfied:
β ≤∩ α and α ≤◦ β
Even in this type system the access control is made by means of binary attributes as in [7], however the co-
capabilities and the security levels (that play a role similar to the one of groups) permit to express security policies at
a finer grain of discrimination.
Obviously the SA primitives allow to encode access protocols. For example, the communication channels can now
be represented as follows:
a channel: ch c | P = (ν cb, cp)cb[!in cb |!out cb |!open cp] | P
channel output: c〈M〉 = cp[in cb.open cp.〈M〉]
channel input: c(x).Q = (ν p)(cp[in cb.open cp.(x).p[outcb.open p.Q]] | open p)
with cb and cp fresh for Q
A security policy, related to movement operations, which imposes that the buffer channel ambients cb be immobile
(i.e. they never jump into or out other ambients) can now be enforced by the type system of SA [18], because, unlike
MA, co-actions allow to force the opening of cp after their jumping into the buffer. However in SA, the channels can
be realized also in a compositional and distributed way:
a channel c: ambient name c, ch c | P = (ν c)P
channel output: c〈M〉 = c[in c.open c.〈M〉]
channel input: c(x).Q = (ν p)(c[in c.open c.(x).p[out c.open p.Q] | out c] | open p)
with c and p fresh for Q
In this encoding the co-actions guarantee that exactly one output ambient enters an input one and they control when
the input ambient is opened.
Since the encoding of write/read operations on the channels is made using the movement and opening operations, it
is quite obvious that the write/read channel rights can be described by means of the movement and opening rights.
That can be seen, for example, in the encoding of secure channels, shown in [16]. In this example the multilevel
security types (that control the movement and the open operations) are used to enforce a confidentiality (no read up,
no write down) policy for the channels. The basic idea is to represent the read/write level hierarchy of a process P
by means of the order relation ≤◦; a channel c is encoded by two fresh ambient names: cr of level rc and cw of level
wc. Let σ {c〈M〉} and ρ{c(x).P} denote the output and input requests on the channel c from processes of level σ and
ρ respectively. We present here a simplified version of the encoding presented in [16]; in this encoding a channel c is
supposed to be dedicated to link producer processes of security level σ with consumer processes of security level ρ.
σ {c〈M〉} = σ [in cr .open σ | cw[in ρ.open cw.〈M〉]]
ρ{c(x).Q}= cr [in cr .open σ.out cr .in ρ.open cr .(x).Q |
| ρ[in ρ.open cw.out cr .in ρ.open ρ]] | open cr | open ρ.
It is easy to see that the communication protocol states that the ambient cr opens the ambient σ , whereas the
ambient ρ opens cw, so the protocol is well typed only if:
- σ ≤◦ rc
- wc ≤◦ ρ.
If the integrity policy (no write up, no read down) is required, we need to modify the protocol in a perfectly
symmetric way:
σ {c〈M〉} = cw[in cw.open ρ.out cw.in σ.open cw.〈M〉 |
| σ [in σ.open cr .out cw.in σ.open σ ]] | open cw | open σ
ρ{c(x).Q}= ρ[in cw.open ρ | cr [in σ.open cr .(x).Q]].
Now the communication protocol imposes that the ambient cw opens the ambient ρ, whereas the ambient σ must
open cr ; so the protocol is well typed only if:
- ρ ≤◦ wc
- rc ≤◦ σ .
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Fig. 6. Two typing rules for CA.
If a commercial (no read up, no write up) policy is needed, one has to use a new protocol, for example:
σ {c〈M〉} = σ [in cr .open σ | cw[in cw.open ρ.open cw.〈M〉]]
ρ{c(x).Q} = cr [in cr .open σ.open cr | ρ[in cw.open ρ.(x).Q]] | open cr | open cw.
This protocol imposes that the ambient cr opens the ambient σ , whereas the ambient cw opens ρ; so the protocol
is well typed only if:
- σ ≤◦ rc
- ρ ≤◦ wc.
These examples show that the type system of [16] makes the SA calculus highly expressive in the sense that it is
possible to enforce a wide set of security policies.
A type system for Controlled Ambients is introduced in [27], with the aim of preventing “denial of service” attacks,
rather than of controlling accesses. In CA a type for an ambient n has the form Amb(s, e)[T ] and says that the number
of resources available within n (the size) is s and the number of resources requested by n to the enclosing ambient (the
weight) is e. A type for a process P has the form Proc(t)[T ] and expresses the fact that P can use up to t resources
and can exchange messages of type T . Obviously the typing rules assure that the constraints on the use of the resources
are satisfied. In Fig. 6 two of the most relevant rules are written. Although this type system is not designed to enforce
security policies, in [27] it is pointed out that it can be used to realize some of them. For example, let us consider a
system in which there are only two security levels for processes, and processes at high level are of type Proc(0)[T ]
and processes at low level are of type Proc(1)[T ]. A confidential policy for this system can be realized by imposing
high level information to be stored in ambient of size 0, so assuring that only high level processes can read high level
data.
5. The boxed ambient calculus
Boxed Ambient Calculus (BA) is introduced in [4] with the aim of ensuring the possibility of remote communication
in absence of the “open” primitive, so eliminating the problem of controlling its destructive character. The elimination
of inert processes can be achieved by means of a kind of garbage collection. This calculus, inspired by the Seal
Calculus [28], is provided with primitives that allow sending messages between a parent ambient and a child ambient,
besides local communication like inMA:
input n :
(x)n .P | n[〈M〉.Q | R] → P{M/x} | n[Q | R]
input ↑:
〈M〉.P | n[(x)↑.Q | R] → P | n[Q{M/x} | R]
output n :
〈M〉n .P | n[(x).Q | R] → P | n[Q{M/x} | R]
output ↑:
(x).P | n[〈M〉↑.Q | R] → P{M/x} | n[Q | R]
I. Margaria, M. Zacchi / Theoretical Computer Science 398 (2008) 183–202 197
It is interesting to note that in the rules (input ↑) and (output ↑) the communication with the parent ambient, that
presents a kind of dynamic binding, does not require the knowledge of its name.
In [21] theBA calculus is enriched by the introduction of co-capabilities to make explicit the permissions to traverse
ambient boundaries. Their syntax is the following:
in α α ∈ {n, ?} allow enter of n or all
out α α ∈ {n, ?} allow exit of n or all.
The new rules for input and output reductions become:
n[in m.P | Q] | m[in α.R | S] → m[n[P | Q] | R | S] for α ∈ {n, ?}
m[n[out m.P | Q] | R] | out α.S → n[P | Q] | m[R] | S for α ∈ {n, ?}.
Since this new calculus, named Safe Boxed Ambient Calculus (BSA), requires that the target computation explicitly
names the ambients allowed to enter it, it permits to exclude intruder’s entering in an easy way.
5.1. Authentication
For the access to ambients, the BA calculus follows the authorization model of MA, based on the possession of
suitable keys (usually the ambient names).
There is an obvious way to restate in BA the firewall as presented in the previous sections. The firewall protocol
requires that a trusted process Q possesses two credentials: the ambient names a and k.
AG = a[(x)k .x .Q]
FW = (ν f )( f [k[out f.in a.〈in f 〉] | P]).
In an untyped context the secrecy of the ambient name a is crucial, in the sense that an intruder, that does not know
the key k, could use a to enter firewall.
In BSA the firewall system can be stated as (ν k)(FW | AG) where:
AG = a[in k.(x)k .x .Q]
FW = (ν f )( f [k[out f.in a.〈in f 〉]] | in a.P] | out k).
One can note that now the ambient name a can be seen as a public key, because, owing to the use of co-capability
in k, the good behavior of the system firewall/agent relies only on the secrecy of the private key k.
5.2. Security policies
The communication model underlying BA plays a fundamental role when security and resource protection policies
are considered. In [5] a type system for access control multilevel security is proposed. The structure of types includes
information about the security level associated with each ambient and the access right A ∈ {w, r, wr, shh} for
write/read operations. In this case both the subjects and objects of the Access Control Matrix M are ambients and
such matrix can be defined in such a way that the chosen security policy, depending on the subject and the object
levels and on the access right A, P(σ, ρ,A), is implemented. For example secret society policy can be defined as
follows, if ≤ is the order relation on a lattice of security level:
P(σ, ρ, r) = ρ ≤ σ
P(σ, ρ,w) = ρ ≤ σ
P(σ, ρ, rw) = ρ ≤ σ
P(σ, ρ, shh) = true.
The type of an ambient: σ Amb[E, FA] carries the information of the security level σ and of the types of local
exchanges (E) and upward exchanges of mode A (FA) of processes inside the ambient.
The type of a capability exercised in an ambient of level σ : σCap[FA] says that the upward exchanges have type F
and mode A.
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Fig. 7. The relation of exchange subtyping.
σ Pro[E, FA] is the type of a process of level σ whose local exchanges are of type E and upward exchanges are of
type F and mode A.
The most interesting typing rules are given in Fig. 8 while in Fig. 7 is defined the relation of exchange subtyping ≤.
Moreover for any access A, one has shhA = shh.
One can notice that the security policy chosen for read and write is present in the (Amb)-rule since the upward
exchanges performed by P must “agree” with the policy of the ambient in which P is enclosed, in the (in)-rule that
guarantees the security policy is still satisfied after moving and in the rules (input M) and (output M) that govern
communication to subambients. For upward exchanges no security constraints are specified since they are guaranteed
by the rules governing mobility and ambient enclosing.
The type system is very flexible because one can define several security policies in a standard way.
For example, let us consider the firewall/agent system previously introduced:
AG = a[(x)k .x .Q]
FW = (ν f )( f [k[out f.in a.〈in f 〉] | P]).
The type system is able to ensure that the firewall can access, by means of communications, to the resources of an
entered agent but not the converse. This is achieved by using a commercial security policy and by assigning to the
ambient the following types:
f : φAmb[E, FA] a : αAmb[G, HB]
k : κAmb[σCap[E shh], shh] α < φ and κ ≤ α.
A “stronger” control can be obtained by forcing a to have a level strictly smaller than the level of f . A possible
implementation can be the following, where the agent enters the “pilot” ambient k to read the capability to enter the
firewall.
AG = a[in k.(x).out k.x .Q]
FW = (ν f )( f [k[out f.〈in f 〉a] | P])
If the commercial policy and the following types for the firewall ambient and the pilot ambient are used:
f : φAmb[E, FA]
k : κAmb[shh, shh]
the agent can enter the firewall only if its security level is strictly smaller than the security level of the firewall, so
ensuring firewall resources protected from agent access. So, a can be viewed as a public key or, if one prefers, it can
be eliminated in the sense that, owing to the shape of upward communication, the trusted process Q has no longer to
embed itself in an ambient known to the firewall:
AG = a[in k.(x)↑.out k.x .〈a〉↑.Q]
FW = (ν f )( f [k[out f.〈in f 〉] | (x).P]).
The firewall has to know the name of the agent to use its resources, but it can be asked to entering process Q to share
with the firewall the name of the ambient in which embeds itself to enter the pilot ambient. In this way interaction can
take place only if the agent has the type used by the firewall to receive its name.
As one of the main goals of BA calculus is to express resource access policies, its primitives turn out to be an
effective tools to implement security policies for the use of a resource; nevertheless it focuses only on write and read
operations and the control on entering and crossing ambients is not supported by particular primitive constructs. So
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Fig. 8. A subset of typing rules for BA.
it is quite interesting to investigate the expressiveness of the calculus about other protocols. From the point of view
of communication via channels the Boxed Ambients suggest an interesting implementation, where the task to write
and read on the channel is committed to two fresh ambients w and r , respectively. In the following definition τ is the
security level of the containing ambient t .
channel definition: (ch c : Ch[W, shh]) | P = (ν c : σ Amb[W ])(c[!(x : W ).〈x〉] | P)
asynchronous channel output: c〈M〉 = (ν w : τ Amb[shh, (W )w])w[out t.in c.〈M〉↑]
channel input: c(x).Q = (νr : τ Amb[W, (W )r ])r [out t.in c.(x : W )↑.out c.in t.〈x〉]
| (x : W )r .Q with c fresh for Q
If a security policy is chosen for Boxed Ambients, channels implement that policy to control read/write accesses,
in the sense that any operation noncompatible with the policy results in a type error.
[21] proposes a different type system for (BA) (G-type system in the sequel) based on the notion of ambient group,
that combines value subtyping with both mobility and communication types. A type for an ambient n has the shape:
ambχ [G, mob[{G1, . . . ,Gk}], com[E, F]], where:
- G is the group which n belongs to;
- {G1, . . . ,Gk} is the set of groups of ambients where n may stay or go;
- E, F specify the local topic of conversation and the one in the parent respectively;
- χ ⊆ {i, o, c, r, w} denotes the set of actions the name n can be used for (in and out actions, creation, read and
wri te operations, respectively).
Processes and capabilities have similar types.
Two particular types ⊥ (bottom message type) and > (top message type) are added to the message types in such a
way that⊥  W  > for any value type of the conversation topic. To allow a general subsumption rule for processes
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(sAmb) (sCom)
χ1⊆χ0⊆{i,o,c,r,w}
ambχ0 [G,M,C]  ambχ1 [G,M,C]





I1 I0 O0 O1
rw[I0,O0]  rw[I1,O1]
Fig. 9. A subset of subtyping rules for the G-type system.
(ProAmb)
0 `M :ambc[H,mob[S],com[E,F]] 0 ` P:proc[H,mob[S],com[E,F]]
0 `M[P]:proc[G,mob[∅],com[F,zero]] G ∈S
(ProPar)
0 ` P:Π 0 ` Q:Π
0 ` P | Q:Π
(inputM)
0,x :W ` P:Π 0 `M : ambr [G,mob[S],com[rw[I,O],F]]
0 ` (x :W )M .P:Π I  W
(input ↑)
0,x :W ` P:proc[G,mob[S],com[E,rw[I,O]]]
0 ` (x :W )↑.P:proc[G,mob[S],com[E,rw[I,O]]] I  W
Fig. 10. A subset of G-typing rules for BA.
such topics specify separately the type of legal inputs and outputs: rw[I, O] (O  I ). The least exchange type, that
is the exchange type of a not communicating process, called zero, is defined as rw[>, ⊥].
Ambient types obey to one subtyping rule (s Amb) that is contravariant with respect to the inclusion relation
between the sets χ . For processes and capabilities the subtyping rule is lifted by the subtyping on mobility (sMob)
and by that one on communication (sCom), while the subtyping for exchange types is contravariant for input and
covariant for output types (sExc).
Some of the relevant rules for the G-type system are given in Fig. 9 and in Fig. 10. This type system, combining
mobility and communication types provides a flexible tool to enforce a wide range of security controls. The (ProAmb)
rule is crucial for security. A process n[P] can be typed only if the process P and the ambient n agree on the group,
the mobility type and the communication type.
For example, if the set of processes is partitioned in two subsets: the trusted (T ) and the not trusted (NT )
groups, an ambient n : ambχ [T , mob[{T }], com[E, F]] cannot enclose a not trusted process nor a trusted process
P : proc[T , mob[{T , NT }] com[E, F]] that could drive n into a not trusted ambient.
The G-type system, mostly in its extension for Safe Boxed Ambients, results well suitable to detect intruders;
however, since it defines exchange typing rules similar to that ones of the type system of [4], also the G-type system
allows to impose particular security policies for local and upward communications.
It is possible, for example, to obtain a master/slave communication between a process P and its sons ni [Qi ] specifying
that the parent P is able to address messages naming explicitly its sons, whereas the processes Qi cannot do any
upward communication.
The typing assignment:
ni : amb{c,r,w}[H, mob[S1], com[rw[I, O], zero]]]
m : amb{c}[G ∈ S1, mob[S2], com[rw[I, O], zero]]
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assures the desired behavior for the system:
m[P | n1[Q1] | n2[Q2] | · · · | ni [Qi ] | · · ·].
The ambient security has a twofold aspect: to protect a host from incoming agents and to protect a mobile agent
against malicious attacks. This latter problem is approached by using encrypted keys to “seal” data in [6], where the
sealing mechanism is added to the Boxed Ambient Calculus with co-capabilities. An agent carrying sealed information
can move freely in a network of possibly unreliable sites. The seal rule of reduction is defined in such a way that threads
inside a sealed ambient are protected by means of an encrypted key, that seals the ambient against communication,
while allowing its movement capabilities. The possibility of receiving an encrypted message is conditioned by the
possession of the key used to seal the ambient carrier of the message.
6. More recent results and conclusions
This paper is devoted to the problem of security in Ambient Calculi. A lot of attention is dedicated to mobile
ambients because current global computing activity is based on computational entities moving from one location to
another, exchanging data and interacting with each other.
The goal of the paper is to focus how the problem of the access control has been approached in various Mobile
Ambient Calculi.
Even though the presentation is not exhaustive, it turns out that the type system is the main mechanism to specify
access rights and impose security policies. Actually the type systems are usually used for static checking of the types,
whereas the access control often needs dynamic checking. Therefore it is quite natural that the evolution of the type
systems for the access control in Ambient Calculi pursues essentially the aim of allowing that rights of an ambient
can be checked and changed dynamically.
A basic step is the introduction of a form of dynamic type checking, that can substitute or go along with the usual
static type checking.
A usual technique for dynamic type checking is the use of dependent types, i.e. types that depend on values
computed at run time. This is the approach of [19] that introduces in a type system for MA the notion of abstract
names to keep track of any new capability that an ambient can obtain in its life. This choice makes the programming
task easy and allows great flexibility, shifting the complexity from the programmer to the type system.
In the framework of M3 the dynamic type checking is studied in [14] that considers, for a variant of M3,
communication and mobility properties. The type system takes into account active and passive mobility, so it is
formed by static types controlling the active mobility and by dynamic types specifying the passive mobility. To permit
the type checking during the reduction (i.e. at run time) the primitives for moving processes carry with them the
communication and mobility types of their continuations. The type checking is essentially local. The components
of a dynamic type, controlling mobility rights, can be changed dynamically without violating the subject reduction
property. In [12] a different authorization mechanism to impose the mobility constraints is used for the same calculus:
the authorization is obtained by means of co-moves and privileges. The security policies realized can dynamically
change, by means of suitable co-moves, either by process movements or by communication. The accordance of a term
with the ambient policy is checked locally.
In the setting of Boxed Ambients a first dynamicity result is obtained in BACI [3] by the notion of local
communication interface. This interface consists of a communication port used by the other ambients to communicate
with the current one, and of a local view of the topic of conversation exchanged with the processes enclosed inside
it. With respect to the Boxed Ambients, BACI introduces a greater flexibility in the control of topic of conversation
because it allows that the local view of ambients changes dynamically during migration.
BACIR [11] is an extension of BACI enhanced by a distributed Role-Based Access Control mechanism [25] that
defines the access rights of a subject depending on its role at the moment of the request.
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